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Daniel Cash* 
 
This article focuses upon the proposed ‘Financial CHOICE Act’ that is currently ascending 
through the various stages of the American legislative process, particularly in relation to the 
potential effect upon the regulation of credit rating agencies. The Bill, which recently passed 
through the Financial Services Committee with a 34-26 vote and will now ascend to the full 
House of Representatives, aims to ‘create hope and opportunity for investors, consumers, and 
entrepreneurs by ending bailouts and Too Big To Fail’, amongst a host of other aims. 
However, criticism has already been pouring in for, what is effectively, the proposed 
destruction of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which was designed to protect the American 
people from the iniquities of the marketplace. In this article, the specific focus will be upon 
the relevant sections of the Bill with regards to credit rating agencies because, as will be 
shown, the agencies have and will cause systemic havoc if left unchecked – the question to be 
asked is ‘does the Bill protect the American people, and society moreover, from the venal 
credit rating agencies?’ 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2010, the U.S. introduced The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010, with the expressed aim of ‘promoting the financial stability of the United States 
by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, 
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to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive 
practices’1. Only seven years later, Republican lawmakers – Jeb Hensarling in particular – 
have decided that Dodd-Frank has failed in its mission and that there needs to be sweeping 
reforms established to repeal the ‘provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that make America less 
prosperous, less stable, and less free’2. In this article we will be introduced to the Bill in more 
detail, in addition to examining its potential for it ever becoming an Act of Law. It is 
important to note here, before the analysis even begins, that this Bill may never see the light 
of day as a piece of enacted legislation. It is possible, although some have argued it is more 
likely probable3, that the Bill will pass through the House of Representatives but will be 
dismissed in the Senate, but this should not stop us considering the potential effects of the 
Bill upon the credit rating industry – as just one acute example – for two reasons: firstly, even 
though the widely-held belief is that the Bill will not become an Act, it still may do; 
secondly, it is important in this political environment that we all seek to become proactive in 
assessing the actions of the leaders in society, particularly in light of the politically volatile 
environment the West finds itself in post-2016.  
 
So, in light of this approach, the article will seek to understand the components of the Bill 
that would amend the regulation of the credit rating agencies, because the centralised status 
of the agencies in the modern economy means that any regulation of them, or indeed mis-
regulation, could have dire consequences – a fact proven by the events of 2007/08 in which 
the rating agencies were universally identified as being central to the collapse4. After 
examining the relevant components of the Bill, the article will endeavour to assess the reality 
of the situation and then transpose the Bill’s sentiments onto that understanding – what we 
will see is a blatant ignorance as to the actual targets of these (deregulatory) reforms, which is 
particularly dangerous. Ultimately, the article will conclude by assessing the potential effects 
of the regulation of the rating industry being amended so soon after the Financial Crisis. 
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The Financial CHOICE Bill 
 
The Financial CHOICE Bill, with ‘CHOICE’ being an acronym of ‘Create Hope and 
Opportunity for Investors, Consumers, and Entrepreneurs’, is the brainchild of a small 
number of Republican Representatives led by Jeb Hansarling. The general theme of the bill is 
the widespread repealing of many elements of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, with bank stress 
testing, debit card coverage fees, bailouts, and agency oversight being the clearest targets5. 
The Bill was re-introduced to the Committee only last month, and passed through the 
Committee stage of proceedings extremely quickly, by a vote of 34 to 26. However, in 
general terms, the Bill instantly received criticism from Professor John Coffee, who stated in 
his testimony to the Financial Services Committee that, ultimately, the cumulative effects of 
the Bill ‘will be devastating’6 if enacted – which is a damning verdict on a piece of legislation 
so young.  
 
For our purposes, the aims of the Bill with regards to the regulation of the credit rating 
industry – with which we mean, primarily, the so-called ‘Big Three’ of Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings – are just as telling. One recent news story in the American 
media discusses how, in the opinion of a former senior credit officer and vice-President at 
Moody’s, the Bill is a ‘gift’ to the agencies7, and in analysing the specific sections of the Bill, 
it is hard to disagree. There are, arguably, four stand-out sections of the Bill that are worth 
our attention, and it would be prudent to go through them in turn before we assess the 
potential impact that they would have in the following section. 
 
The first relevant section of the Bill, section 852, seeks to prohibit the Securities and 
Exchange Commission from ‘mandating the specific organisation of the disclosures’ of the 
agencies’ rating methodologies. In technical terms, this looks like an attempt to allow 
agencies scope in how they will disclose their rating methodologies – itself a key factor of 
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rating agency regulation under Dodd-Frank -, but in reality it releases the agencies from their 
obligation to release their methodologies at all, as there is no recommended oversight 
according to the Bill. Next, section 853 concerns the ‘Repeal of Certain Attestation 
Requirements Relating to Credit Ratings’ which, if we look more closely, mandates that the 
Bill repeals the requirement that the ‘Chief Executive Officer of an NRSRO (Nationally 
Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation) attest to its internal controls over processes for 
determining credit ratings’. In essence, the ability to prosecute the leaders of these 
organisations would, in foul swoop, be removed. Yet, the Bill goes further by removing the 
requirement for the NRSRO to disclose whether or not its rating was influenced by ‘business 
activities’, or whether the rating was at least ‘independent’. We will discuss this issue further 
in the next section, but this notion of removing the requirement to disclose aspects such as 
conflicts of interest and independence is nothing short of horrendous. Continuing on this 
point, section 855 states that an NRSRO’s Chief Credit Officer, not its CEO, may now 
approve the agency’s procedures and methodologies, which not only removes the potential 
for liability from the CEO, but places the Chief Credit Officer in a protected position within 
the walls of their own organisation – the CEOs are the recognisable faces of these agencies, 
not the CCOs, which make any substantial prosecutions that much more unlikely. Section 
856, which aims to repeal a crucial element in this industry, states that people who market or 
sell products and services for an NRSRO may now provide information to people who are 
primarily concerned with producing ratings for that NRSRO – essentially, the Bill removes 
any ‘firewalls’ between the commercial and rating interests of an agency, allowing for bias 
and influence to affect the rating the agency gives. Finally, in what is a truly incredible move, 
section 857 repeals the Dodd-Frank regulations concerned with establishing ‘state of mind’ 
when initiating legal action against the agencies, the mandating of studies on the 
independence of rating agencies, the requirement to look at alternative business models, the 
study and establishment of ‘assigned credit ratings’, and last, but certainly not least, the 
repealing of the rescission of the ‘exemption from expert liability afforded to credit rating 
agencies’ – effectively, rating agencies can, once again, protect themselves against legal 
action under the banner of immunity for ‘experts’. 
 
This truly staggering approach to regulating such an industry, an industry which has been 
proven to be unquestionably venal in its approach, is nothing short of reckless. The former 
credit officer called it a ‘gift’ to the agencies, but it is much more than that. At the end of this 
article we will discuss what the Bill represents in reality, but before we do that it is worth 
discussing the reality of the situation with regards to rating agencies both before and after the 
Financial Crisis so that we can properly contextualise the incredible proposals put forward by 
this Bill. 
 
Reality 
 
The Bill puts forward a vision of rating agencies that is defined by a façade of the agencies 
being negatively constrained by regulation. However, we do not have to go back far to see the 
effects of leaving the rating agencies unregulated. The ratings industry as we know it today 
was only formally regulated from 2005/6, with the Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act 
of 2005 and the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 20068, this in spite of the fact that the 
two leading agencies – S&P and Moody’s – are over a century old. Prior to these Acts, the 
only formal regulation was the SEC’s facilitation of the agencies’ expansion in 1975 with the 
adoption of various industry-rules and, eventually, the coveted NRSRO designation9. This 
lack of regulation, when considered against the backdrop of the securities boom in the early 
2000s10, allowed for the agencies to assume a central position within the mortgage-backed 
securities market and peddle their services to the highest bidder. This article will not go into 
extensive detail regarding this era in the rating agencies’ existence, mostly because it is 
extremely extensive and has been well covered in the literature11, but recent settlements 
between the leading agencies and the US Department of Justice (DoJ), together with actions 
taken by the SEC, can provide us with the proof that the Bill is not considering the reality of 
the situation. 
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In 2015, the DoJ settled with S&P for a grand total of $1.375 billion for consciously engaging 
in a ‘scheme to defraud investors in structured finance products’12. This was, for the most 
part, in relation to the actions of S&P with regards to its involvement in rating, and in some 
cases even establishing ‘structured investment vehicles’, which as entities sought to sell 
stakes in securities but lasted no longer than a few months, causing massive institutional 
investors to lose billions of dollars in the process13. The agency admitted to this, and had also 
been banned for the period of one year for engaging in similar activities as late as 2012, in 
which they were consciously releasing misinformation to investors that they knew would 
endanger their investments but enrich the issuers of the debt, who not coincidentally pay the 
agencies their fees14. It is important that we deduce from this the unmistakable realisation 
that, in light of these catastrophic transgressions, it would be surely foolish to suggest that 
rating agencies should be relieved of their duties to disclose how they arrive at a certain 
rating, and what influences may have affected that process – yet, the Bill does just that. 
 
In the Senate investigation, the actual processes of the rating agencies were examined in 
detail. What was found was that the processes established by agencies, namely the famous 
‘rating committees’ that are designed to foster neutrality and independence by way of 
anonymous votes and other techniques, were actually exposed to the cross-pollination 
between commercially-interested employees and ratings-interested employees – in direct 
opposition to the stated policies of the agencies15 - with one extract from the investigation 
confirming that rating analysts were being ‘out-voted’ by ‘mystery voters with no “logic-
trail” to refer to’16. In addition to this, there also exists a symbiotic pressure between the 
agencies and the issuers of debt with regards to additional services, with the agencies forcing 
the rated company to purchase additional services via the threat of a downgrade, also known 
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as ‘tying’17, and the opposing pressure that issuers may induce, whereby they would exert 
pressure for higher ratings based on the continuing purchase of additional services18. These 
dynamics mean that proposing to remove the firewall that is in place to prohibit the cross-
pollination of information between commercially-interested employees and ratings-interested 
employees would surely be foolish. Yet, the Bill does just that. 
 
In the lead up to the settlement between S&P and the DoJ, many questioned why Moody’s 
was not the target of an identical investigation, because, as with any oligopoly, it is more than 
likely that the components of that oligopoly will act in exactly the same manner19. The reason 
for this was because under new rules established by Dodd-Frank, one must obtain proof of 
the agencies’ ‘state of mind’ in order to be successful. In seeking to bring action against S&P, 
CalPERS, an institutional investor, settled with Fitch Ratings but, crucially, it settled not for 
money but for documented evidence. It was this evidence, one can safely assume, that led to 
S&P accepting their fate and deciding that a settlement with the DoJ (and CalPERS) was the 
most palatable of the options facing them at the time. It was that same evidence that then 
allowed the DoJ to settle with Moody’s in January 2017 for $864 million, with Moody’s 
admitting fault – which, in this industry, is a truly extraordinary occurrence – with respect to 
its failings in managing the ‘firewalls’ within its organisation, and in covertly departing from 
published rating methodological practices20. This mandate of requiring proof of intent 
ultimately allowed us all to see the true nature of these agencies like never before, with both 
agencies admitting their guilt. It forced the agencies to admit their guilt, rather than initiating 
their age-old practices of prolonging and constraining legal action. To remove this mandate, 
with the tangible effects that we witnessed over the last two years, would surely be foolish. 
Yet, the Bill does just that. 
 
In regards to the target of the Bill, it arguably does not exist. The regulations suggested by the 
Republican Representatives are simply not appropriate for the agencies as they exist, and this 
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is the only conclusion we can arrive at, simply because the evidence is in front of us. The 
agencies themselves have admitted to consciously defrauding investors for profit, and to 
endangering the very fabric of the economy – trust in information. To suggest that these 
agencies, literally months after they admit to these crimes, should be regulated less, is 
potentially one of the most irresponsible suggestions in recent history. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, the Financial CHOICE Bill represents the ideological division that wreaks havoc. 
There is no one right ideology, but the division for division’s sake that is manifested in this 
ludicrous regulatory proposal is symptomatic of a much larger problem. It is likely that this 
Bill will never be enacted as a piece of legislation, but the excessive lurching between 
regulation and deregulation is extremely dangerous for societal progression. Yet, it is very 
important that we acknowledge the aims of this Bill and counter them as vociferously as 
possible, because the potential situation should the Bill pass into an Act is extremely 
frightening. It is frightening because between the Great Depression and the Financial Crisis 
stood over 70 years of societal development; if this Bill were to be enacted, it would facilitate 
the pilfering of society but, this time, we would have had only a decade to recover – it simply 
is not long enough. The rates of austerity, suicide, mental illness, homelessness, and poverty, 
are far too high to sustain another assault, and for this reason, above many other reasons, this 
Bill cannot come to pass.  
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